Maybe even Richard Dawkins himself believes it is so. From Breitbart:
In a text that is coursing about on social media, professional God-slayer Richard Dawkins begrudgingly admitted that Christianity may actually be our best defense against aberrant forms of religion that threaten the world.
“There are no Christians, as far as I know, blowing up buildings,” Dawkins said. “I am not aware of any Christian suicide bombers. I am not aware of any major Christian denomination that believes the penalty for apostasy is death.”
In a rare moment of candor, Dawkins reluctantly accepted that the teachings of Jesus Christ do not lead to a world of terror, whereas followers of radical Islam perpetrate the very atrocities that he laments.
Because of this realization, Dawkins wondered aloud whether Christianity might indeed offer an antidote to protect western civilization against jihad.
“I have mixed feelings about the decline of Christianity, in so far as Christianity might be a bulwark against something worse,” he said.
Granted this was said in 2010, but with all that continues to develop in our world I can see no reason for him to have changed his opinion much.
This reminds me of an article by Salvo columnist Cameron Wybrow, where he points out that Nietzsche came to similar conclusions . . . .
Often one can learn something from authors with whom one disagrees. An author with whom I disagree, but from whom I have learned a good deal, is Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900).
Nietzsche was rabidly anti-Christian and anti-Platonic, and thus opposed two of the foundational pillars of Western civilization. Nonetheless, I find that his analysis of the modern West, including its religion, is sometimes perceptive and warrants consideration.
In one of the most contemptuous of old books, Twilight of the Idols (1889), Nietzsche wrote:
[The English] are rid of the Christian God and now believe all the more firmly that they must cling to Christian morality. . . . In England one must rehabilitate oneself after every little emancipation from theology by showing . . . what a moral fanatic one is. . . .
We others hold otherwise. When one gives up the Christian faith, one pulls the right to Christian morality out from under one’s feet. . . . Christianity is a system, a whole view of things thought out together. By breaking one main concept out of it, the faith in God, one breaks the whole. . . . Christianity presupposes that man does not know, cannot know, what is good for him, what evil: he believes in God, who alone knows it. Christian morality is a command; its origin is transcendent; it is beyond all criticism, all right to criticism; it has truth only if God is the truth—it stands and falls with faith in God.
When the English actually believe that they know “intuitively” what is good and evil, when they therefore suppose that they no longer require Christianity as the guarantee of morality, we merely witness the effects of the dominion of the Christian value judgment and an expression of the strength and depth of this dominion: such that the origin of English morality has been forgotten, such that the very conditional character of its right to existence is no longer felt. For the English, morality is not yet a problem.